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Insights
This contribution bites off more than it can possibly chew, by aiming to raise questions 
of institutional governance in the EU, and discuss 
the potential to inject the system with a greater 
measure of democracy than is in store there 
currently. Alexandrian Libraries could be filled 
with the amassed publications on this topic, so that 
any attempt to engage in a complete survey would 
be doomed to failure from the very beginning. 
As a starting point, it is perhaps better to take 
our cue from the rather common complaint that 
citizens have so far been insufficiently involved 
in the process of European integration, while the 
sphere of decision-making that is perceived as 
enjoying a maximum of popular legitimacy, the 
nation-state, has been steadily eroded. Allegedly, 
the current financial, migration and geopolitical 
crises created a perfect storm, placing further 
dents in the general support for the Union and 
its policies – though it should not be overlooked 
that commentators pointing in this respect to 
‘record levels of distrust’ usually fail to mention 
that the numbers are rarely more positive for 
domestic institutions (and often even worse). 
Nevertheless, it seems that in several quarters the 
pressures have truly reached a boiling point, with 
referendums being staged or advocated in various 
countries, as if to compensate the people for the 
earlier diminution of power. Simultaneously, it is 
wondered with ever greater frequency whether 
the Union, in its present form, can be redeemed 
at all – some even arguing that one may be 
vehemently pro-Europe, and then (by necessary 
consequence) anti-EU.
To be sure, quite a bit of the criticism is well-deserved, and already decades ago, the 
‘democratic deficit’ became a staple of academic 
discourse. Certainly, only few can be expected 
to fathom the convoluted interplay between the 
Commission, the Council and the Parliament, 
so different from the separation of powers 
concept that many prefer to cling to. Moreover, 
the role played by the European Council, the 
Court of Justice, the European Central Bank 
and an increasing number of agencies reinforce 
the sentiment that traditional (national) forums 
are easily bypassed, sovereign governments 
emasculated, and civil society actors marginalised. 
Formally, the Treaties declare that the functioning 
of the Union “is founded on representative 
democracy” – yet in the eyes of its critics, it poses 
a threat to precisely the latter. Most jarringly 
indeed, the polymorphous character of the EU’s 
legislature and executive arm renders voters 
unable to make use of their classic prerogative 
to “vote the scoundrels out”. Adding insult to 
injury, the 751 elected representatives still hardly 
manage to place their stamp on the decisions 
made, and the overall course plotted. In essence, 
unaccountable officials continue to determine the 
overall heading, at arcane summits and in obscure 
back-rooms. 
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Even in such random, visceral accusations, there thus remains an element of truth; and 
contrary to what is often assumed, no amount of 
communication is likely to dispel the predominant 
negative impressions, let alone the outright 
hostility that has taken root. Targeted action 
is required instead, and tangible adaptations. 
Happily, a number of schemes can be identified 
that have recently been deployed to this purpose. 
With some adjustment, it is contended here that 
they are, in due time, bound to further the cause 
of democratic change. 
The Spitzenkandidaten venture
As witnessed in 2014, the all-new way of installing a new European Commission 
entails a pre-selection by political families of 
suitable candidates; debate and discussion as 
appropriate; and then the heads of state and 
government of the various Member States 
eventually anointing the person whose party 
has emerged triumphantly in the European 
Parliament elections. The subsequent hearings 
with the individual candidate-members and 
election of the Commission as a whole have 
brought additional transparency, oversight and 
accountability that can only be applauded. This 
new and refreshing approach came however with 
the big risk of politicising the most important 
supranational institution – traditionally regarded 
as fair, neutral and independent – potentially 
sparking ideologically motivated resistance 
from national governments. So far, no such 
negative consequences have materialised, 
though with its recent controversial proposals 
on balancing budgets, redistribution of refugees, 
and reprimanding of Hungary and Poland, the 
Commission may have moved somewhat closer 
to the brink. It would therefore be advised to 
hark back to its predominantly technocratic role 
as guardian of the Treaties, avoiding the merest 
semblance of partiality. For that reason also, 
overly creative solutions and all too dashing 
enforcement actions are perhaps better mitigated 
or reconsidered, leaving the other institutions the 
choice to pull the reins whenever possible.
‘Transnationalising’ elections to the 
European Parliament
A much older, but still more tentative proposal pertains to a reform of the European 
Parliament’s electoral base, enabling citizens to 
vote for any of the participating parties in the 
country where they go to the polls. If they wish, 
they could thus decide to back a candidate running 
for a seat in another Member State, a proposal 
which is believed useful in breaking the unhelpful 
nexus between national and European politics. 
Rather, in this setup, candidate MEPs are free to 
seek (and obtain) the approval of multitudes that 
do not reside in their constituency of choice, but 
will in turn be forced to broaden their agenda. On 
the one hand, this is likely to improve the extent to 
which voters believe themselves to be represented, 
and the sense of demos across borders. One the 
other, due care should be taken that this dilution 
of the electorate does not produce a too distorted 
picture of the composition of the body politic. It 
appears sensible then to only create the possibility 
for casting a vote in favour of a candidate standing 
in another Member State for a seat that is also 
allocated to that Member State.
The European Citizens’ Initiative
Since mid-2012, it has become possible to prepare, organise and submit a so-called 
European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI), which may 
eventually lead to the adoption of a new binding 
legal act by the EU legislature. As a result, alongside 
the Member States and the institutions, a specific 
place has now been carved out for ‘the people’ on 
the supranational plane. The novel instrument 
reveals with unprecedented clarity which ideas 
loom under the surface, and what positions can 
count on grassroots support across the Union. 
Moreover, it is conducive to the development 
of a common espace public. For sure, the first 
experiences have not been all that cheerful, with 
intended campaigns being shot down before 
launch by the Commission, or entirely failing to 
ZEI Insights provide commentary and critical analysis on governance and regulation issues related to the future of the 
European Union. Authors are responsible for their own views.
ZEI Insights No.35/2016 
 
persuade the latter to take follow-up action. Out 
of spite, the ECI been disqualified as a ‘dressed-
up right of petition’, but such remarks overlook 
the fact that petitions are to be addressed to 
the Parliament, an institution with no right of 
legislative initiative. Also, an ECI attracts greater 
visibility, is for legal and practical reasons more 
difficult to suppress, and does not require the 
applicants to demonstrate that they themselves 
are directly concerned. This experiment in direct 
democracy therefore deserves more credit than it 
has received so far – though it will need to actually 
start delivering quite soon.
***
There is no denying that Rodrik’s famous trilemma, originally devised for the globalised 
world order, applies wholly and immediately to 
the EU: it is impossible to pursue democracy, 
national sovereignty and economic integration at 
the same time. If the goal is to deepen integration, 
either national sovereignty or democracy are 
bound to suffer. If democracy is to be maintained, 
either the national sovereignty or economic 
integration is to be sacrificed. If sovereignty takes 
pride of place, a choice has to be made between 
democracy or further economic integration. The 
trade-off can never be avoided altogether – but as 
briefly outlined above, democracy and integration 
may yet go hand in hand in a polity that, already 
long ago, consciously decided to relegate the third 
value in the equation.
On that footing, in the past sixty years, EU institutions acquired tremendous 
governance powers. Originally, input legitimacy 
was weak, and intentionally so. This gradually 
improved, while a concomitant increase took place 
in output legitimacy (widely cherished benefits 
in terms of e.g. economic growth, consumer 
protection, or quality of the natural environment). 
Today, the key institutional challenge might very 
well reside in combining genuine input with 
throughput legitimacy; by fomenting additional 
procedural pathways, stimulating an ever greater 
number of people to participate, guaranteeing 
transparency in decision-making, and convincing 
the participants that their voices are heard. The 
foregoing however remains premised on the broad 
acceptance of a curtailed national sovereignty. If 
the earlier consensus on that principle were to 
evaporate, the Union could ultimately find itself 
beyond redemption indeed.
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